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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the Bolivian economy. The 
PEP 1-1 Standard Model has been employed to analyze the effects of a reduction in (i) the 
world export prices of mining and agriculture, (ii) the world demand of textiles, and (iii) 
transfers to households (i.e., remittances) from abroad. The model has been calibrated to a 
new 2006 SAM for Bolivia. The households have been disaggregated according to their 
location (urban and rural) and ethnicity (indigenous and non-indigenous). The factors of 
production have been disaggregated into skilled and unskilled labor, capital, and natural 
resources. Not surprisingly, our results highlight the relevance of the decrease in the export 
price of natural gas in explaining the negative effects of the Global Financial Crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
The current Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is unlike almost all the international economic 
crisis triggered recently in the developed world, such as the 2001-2002 or 1990-1991 crisis, 
only to mention the most recent ones. According to CEPAL, the World is experiencing the 
worst crisis since the thirties and it is becoming worst since it is affecting the real sectors of 
most economies around the world. Although it can be compared to the Great Depression, it 
has certain peculiarities that make it different and a subject that has to be analyzed with 
stringency. 
The GFC is a financial-banking crisis that emerged in a period of an unprecedented 
sustained growth of the world economy. Banking crises have plagued the world for 
centuries. According to Cecchetti et al. (2009), while they may be quite common, financial 
crises also tend to be quite diverse: initial conditions are different, industrial and 
institutional structures are different, levels of development are different, degrees of 
openness are different, policy frameworks are different, and external conditions are 
different.
1
 
The GFC has different characteristics in both its origin and consequences. It originated in 
the new international financial system, established from a set of new financial instruments 
systematically integrated: the securitization and credit deregulation, computerization of 
money circulation, financial globalization, financial derivatives, new speculative 
investment funds, among others. All of these elements were evident in the U.S. economy, 
and it is precisely in that country that the GFC started with the mortgage crisis on the 
second half of 2008.
2
 
The GFC and resulting economic crisis is creating widespread concern around the world. 
The IMF’s October 2009 update of the World Economic Outlook projected a reduction in 
                                               
1 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) report that, over the past two centuries, the 66 countries they study have 
experienced 286 banking crisis, 105 of which have come since 1945. On average, countries have been in 
crisis for roughly one year out of every 12.  
2
 Interesting analyses on the origins of the crisis may be found in the articles compiled in section I of Felton 
and Reinhart (2008). For more recent discussions see Brunnermeier (2009) and Diamond and Rajan (2009). 
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global economic growth from just under 3.5% in 2008 to about 0.8% in 2009. Although a 
recovery is expected in 2010 as a result of the monetary and fiscal stimulus programs 
undertaken in most industrialized countries, the IMF recognizes that the current rebound 
will be sluggish, credit constrained and, for quite some time, jobless. Financial and 
corporate restructuring will continue to exert considerable downward pressure on activity, 
and wide output gaps will help keep inflation at low levels. Demand is likely to be 
dampened by the need in many advanced economies to rebuild savings. Downside risks to 
growth are receding gradually but remain a concern. 
The GFC puts at risk the efforts developing countries are making to accelerate and maintain 
growth and reduce poverty as presented in the UN Millennium Development Goals. For 
instance, the African countries are in a difficult position to face yet another crisis after the 
recent increases of oil and food prices. In the Latin American countries, the effects of the 
crisis have been different, according to their relationship and level of financial integration 
with the industrialized economies, and the type and level of development of their 
economies. Mexico, for example, fully integrated to the U.S. economy, entered into a 
recession.  
The economic downturn in industrialized countries will affect developing countries 
differently according to their initial conditions and domestic policy responses to the crisis, 
through various channels of impact: trade volumes, world prices, remittances, foreign direct 
investment, capital flows and commercial lending, and aid flows. However, several South 
American countries seem more resilient and less tied to the U.S. recession. With less 
external debt, most South American countries, especially the ones that are rich in raw 
materials and/or hydrocarbon display large international reserves as a result of several years 
of economic expansion and high world prices for raw materials. This fact puts these 
countries in a better position to face the crisis in spite of being historically and structurally 
disadvantaged by their reliance on commodities.  
Bolivia, a landlocked country, historically poor, with severe structural economic 
constraints, seems to have a more favorable macroeconomic situation and a new fiscal 
capacity to promote measures for public investment and redistribution to dampen the crisis, 
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at least in the short term. In fact, in 2008, Bolivia’s GDP growth was 6.1%, one of the 
highest in the region, and according to the IMF the rate of growth will be 2.8% in 2009, the 
highest expected in the Western Hemisphere. 
Certainly, this does not mean that the crisis has not been felt or will not be felt in the near 
future. Dabat (2009) and Ticehurst (2009) analyze the GFC in a broad context and mention 
its possible consequences for the Bolivian economy, but none of them quantify the 
economic effects of different shocks. Capra and Canavire (2009) use the MAMS model – a 
recursive dynamic CGE model – to analyze the effects of a reduction in the export prices of 
mining, hydrocarbons and agricultural goods; they find that the GDP would decrease in 5% 
in comparison to the base scenario. Jemio and Nina (2009) used a Macroeconomic 
Consistency model to analyze the effects of the crisis. They analyzed the marginal impact 
(one time impact) over the real sector of external and internal shocks. For instance, they 
analyzed a 50% reduction in the world price of natural gas, a 50% fall in remittances, a 
50% fall in the price of minerals, a 10% reduction in the mining activity, and a 5% decrease 
in public investment. 
The effects of the GFC in an economy wide context have not yet been analyzed. Therefore, 
we assess the impact of different shocks to the Bolivian economy through a computable 
general equilibrium model (CGE). In particular, we implement the PEP Standard Model for 
the Bolivian economy using a SAM for the year 2006. In this study, we use the model to 
quantify the effects the GFC and assess different policy response alternatives.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the economic 
performance of the Bolivian economy in the last 5 years. Section 3 presents the 
methodology and data used as well as the principal characteristics of the computable 
general equilibrium model. Section 4 displays the results of the simulations, detailing the 
aggregate and sectoral effects. The last section concludes and proposes policy responses to 
face the impact of the crisis in Bolivia. 
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2. Economic Performance 
In this section, we present a short review of recent macro trends in the Bolivian economy. 
In particular, this section covers the last five years (period 2004-2009), which is a period 
characterized by the end of a deep political and social crisis that ended in 2006 with the 
election of Evo Morales as the first indigenous president of Bolivia. It is also characterized 
by an extremely favorable external context that allowed the economy to reach important 
growth rates driven mainly by the extractive sectors. Finally, in the last two years, it is 
characterized by the occurrence of the GFC, that has affected the economy, but not with the 
strength that many analysts predicted. 
The Bolivian economy reached its highest growth in 2008 with an annual rate of 6.15%. 
But then, in 2009, the economy displayed signs of deceleration, attributed mainly to the 
GFC; its effects turned visible in the extractive and industrial activities on the supply side, 
and in consumption on the demand side. Nevertheless, Bolivia continued being one of the 
countries with the best economic performance in the region.  
Figure 2.1: Rates of Growth of GDP and GDP without Extractive Activities (quarterly 
rates) 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia  
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The signs of slowdown of the economy appeared in the forth quarter of 2008 when the 
annual rate of growth fall to 4.2%, and then in the first quarter of 2009 when the rate of 
growth was 2.1%. Notice that in the previous quarters, growth reached rates higher than 
6%. The production in extractive activities slowed down also but with less intensity. The 
rate of growth fell to 3.1% and 2.7% in the forth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009, 
respectively, but then it recovered its 2008’s values, being above 4% in the second and 
third quarters of 2009. 
In the last five years, the GDP growth has been driven by internal demand (see Figure 2.2). 
On the other hand, net exports showed a negative contribution to growth, due to a larger 
increase in imports than in exports. Private consumption showed an important positive 
contribution to growth in the whole period, but in particular in the last three quarters of 
2008. Private investment also displayed a positive and important incidence on growth in the 
last three quarters of 2008, although it showed a negative incidence in the forth quarter of 
2007, the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009.  
Figure 2.2: GDP Components (incidence of determinants and GDP growth in %ages) 
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Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE) 
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Public consumption grew on average at 3.6% between 2006 and 2008. In fact, private and 
public consumption have been important factors in explaining GDP growth in particular in 
the last years. Investment declined in 2009. In the second quarter of 2009 it showed a 
negative annual growth rate of -9.64%, while in the same period the year before it showed 
an annual growth of 26.45%. On average, it grew only by 1.55% between 2006 and 2008 
(quarterly growth).  
Bolivian economic structure is mainly based on the exports of raw materials, like minerals 
and hydrocarbons. Although the GFC reduced the external demand and lead to a decrease 
in the average price of exports in comparison to the exceptional elevated prices of 2008, the 
current account remained positive but with a decreasing trend, showing a slight recovery in 
the second quarter of 2009, but then decreasing again. 
Figure 2.3: Current Account Exports and Imports (millions of USD) 
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 Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
With the outbreak of the GFC in 2008, external revenues have reduced, but they are still 
considerable high when compared with levels observed during the first half of the decade. 
Recall that Bolivian exports are strongly concentrated in raw materials; five products 
comprise around 80% of total exports (natural gas, zinc, tin, silver and soya) (see Figure 
2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Concentration of Bolivian Exports (2004-2009) 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
Export prices of minerals and oil experienced an unprecedented increase since 2005 (see 
figures 2.5 and 2.6). They reached their peaks in the first half of 2008 and then experienced 
a downturn in the second half of the same year. But they started to recover in the second 
half of 2009. Natural gas export prices have reduced—with a lag—after the price of oil 
went down, but they are expected to recover now that the price of oil is increasing again. 
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Figure 2.5: Oil and Natural Gas Export Prices 
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Source: Bolivian Central Bank 
Prices of minerals experienced important increases in the years 2006 and 2007, but then 
experienced sharp reductions as a result of the GFC. In particular, in 2008, the reductions 
have been in the order of 52% for Zinc, 26% for Tin, 32% for Silver and 2% for Gold. 
Nevertheless, these prices have partially recovered in 2009. For instance, during 2009, the 
price of zinc and silver increased by 98% and 86%, respectively. 
Figure 2.6: Mineral Prices (Zinc, Tin, Silver and Gold) 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
It is important to emphasize that Bolivia’s economic boom is first and foremost explained 
by a price effect. The economic structure remained almost the same, without productive 
investments and with increasing distortions in the allocation of resources, in particular in 
the manufacturing industry. In fact, this sector showed a decrease in its rate of growth of 
3.4 percentage points in the first quarter of 2009 compared to the same period of 2008. This 
situation reduced its share of GDP to only 0.2%, a value well below the 0.8% observed in 
the previous year.
3
 
The decline in industry growth is due to the contraction of activities like textiles and 
jewelry, due to the uncertainty that arose after the close of U.S. markets in North America 
by the end of the ATPDEA as well as the loss of European Union markets.
4
 
The surplus of the balance of payments is reflected in an increase in the net international 
reserves. These reserves as a share of GDP are the highest in the region and in the whole 
Bolivian economic history. According to Canavire and Mariscal (2010), the Current 
Account surplus is not only explained by the proceeds from exports (mainly sales of natural 
gas), but also by other factors such as remittances from Bolivians living abroad and a 
reduction in the service of external debt (interests). Gross International Reserves grew from 
USD 1798.4 million in 2005 to USD 7722.2 million in 2008. 
                                               
3 Distortions in the allocation of resources in the manufacturing industry have been analyzed first by 
Machicado and Birbuet (2009) for the market liberalization period (1988-2001).  
4 The ATPDEA was a preferential regime granted by the US to the Andean countries to create labor 
alternatives that could substitute the coca plantations. It was cancelled by the US government in December 
2008 as a response to the expulsion of the DEA by the Bolivian government. 
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Due to the GFC, remittances went down in the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 
2009, but partially recovered in the second quarter of 2009. In particular, the monthly 
variations of remittances that showed slightly negative variations in the months of January, 
February and April, were compensated by the increases in March and May.  
Figure 2.7: Evolution of Remittances (quarterly variation, in %ages) 
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Source: Central Bank of Bolivia 
In figure 2.7 we show the quarterly variation of remittances. Notice that the positive and 
large variations observed between the fourth quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2007 
ended in 2007. In the following quarters the variations are below 10% and even negative 
since the fourth quarter of 2008. If this pattern continues, we could expect a decrease in 
private consumption and a corresponding decrease in aggregate demand. 
To end this brief review of the economy, we show the evolution of poverty and inequality 
(see Table 2.1). Poverty in Bolivia reached its highest level in the year 2000 (66.4%) and it 
decreased in 6.3 percentage points until 2007. On the other hand, extreme poverty 
decreased from 45.2% in 2000 to 37.7% in 2007. Notice that poverty is higher in rural areas 
than in urban areas. In rural areas it is around 75% while in urban areas it is around 50%. In 
addition, the estimations for 2008 seem to indicate that the GFC has not increased poverty. 
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Table 2.1: Poverty and Inequality Indicators (Poverty Line Method) 
Geographic area and indicators 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003-2004 2005 2006 2007 (p) 2008 (e)
Bolivia
Poverty incidence (%) 64.8 63.6 63.5 66.4 63.1 63.3 63.1 60.6 59.9 60.1 59.3
Extreme poverty incidence (%) 41.2 38.1 40.7 45.2 38.8 39.5 34.5 38.2 37.7 37.7 32.7
Gini index 0.6 0.6 0.58 0.62 0.59 0.60 n.d. 0.60 0.59 0.56 n.d.
Urban area  
Poverty incidence (%) 51.9 54.5 51.4 54.5 54.3 53.9 54.4 51.1 50.3 50.9 51.2
Extreme poverty incidence (%) 23.7 24.9 23.5 27.9 26.2 25.7 22.9 24.3 23.4 23.7 22.0
Gini index 0.51 0.52 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.54 n.d. 0.54 0.53 0.51 n.d.
Capital cities (1)  
Poverty incidence (%) 48.4 50.7 46.4 52.0 50.5 51.0 52.8 47.5 46.0 48.0 n.d.
Extreme poverty incidence (%) 20.9 21.3 20.7 25.7 22.3 23.9 21.7 21.8 21.1 21.9 n.d.
Rural area  
Poverty incidence (%) 84.4 78.0 84.0 87.0 77.7 78.8 77.7 77.6 76.5 77.3 74.3
Extreme poverty incidence (%) 67.8 59.0 69.9 75.0 59.7 62.3 53.7 62.9 62.2 63.9 53.3
Gini index 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.63 n.d. 0.66 0.64 0.64 n.d.
Source: UDAPE, (p) preliminary, (e) based on estimations, (1) includes El Alto  
According to the Gini coefficient, inequality has decreases slightly in the last three years 
(2005-2007), from 0.60 to 0.56 -- in urban areas it decreased by 0.03 percentage points and 
in rural areas by 0.02 percentage points. Nevertheless, poverty and inequality remain high.  
In sum, in the last 5 years, the Bolivian economy has been characterized by an extremely 
favorable external context, that allowed maintaining macroeconomic stability and boost 
growth, but it remains the question if this growth is stable and can help to reduce poverty. 
From this external context, three elements are key as identified by Jemio and Nina (2009): 
 much higher revenues of hydrocarbons and minerals, due to a price effect, 
 larger remittances from Bolivians that live and work abroad (USA, Spain and 
Argentina), and  
 volatile and less prominent capital flows 
There is the thought that the GFC will impact negatively the economy by a combination of 
these three factors and will affect not only the macroeconomic variables, but also sectoral 
variables and social indicators.  
3. Methodology and Data 
In this paper we implement the PEP Standard (CGE) Model calibrated to a 2006 Bolivian 
SAM. The CGE model mathematical structure is extensively documented in Decaluwé et 
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al. (2009). The main data requirements to calibrate the CGE model are a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM), and production and consumption elasticities.  
3.1 Data 
This section presents a short explanation of the steps followed in building the 2006 SAM 
for Bolivia and further adapting it for the PEP-1-1 Standard Model; for details see the 
Appendix.  
The main source of information for the construction of a new Bolivian SAM are the Input-
Output tables for Bolivia in 2006 (latest available) constructed by the National Institute of 
Statistics (INE, 2006). They present information on production, intermediate consumption, 
final demand (i.e., households and government consumption), exports, value added, and 
taxes on activities and commodities. Besides, information from the balance of payments is 
the most important input to build the external accounts of the SAM. To build the 
government account, data for 2006 from INE provides what was required. To disaggregate 
labor payments and households, we used the Bolivian Household Survey (Encuesta 
Continua de Hogares) for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
In building the 2006 SAM for Bolivia we followed the procedure proposed in Reinert and 
Roland-Holst (1997). The process has a top-down structure, entailing the following steps: 
(i) construction of an aggregate SAM (hereafter, macro-sam), (ii) disaggregation of the 
macro-sam into a matrix with a relatively large sectoral breakdown (hereafter, micro-sam), 
and (iii) balancing of the micro-SAM to make it suitable for the calibration of the PEP 
Standard Model; note that the imbalances were related to rounding errors. 
Table 3.1 shows the accounts in the SAM. The productive sector is split in 19 activities and 
commodities: 4 primary, 7 manufactures, and 8 services. This sectoral disaggregation 
allows us to isolate the main productive sectors in Bolivia. The SAM identifies two types of 
labor: those with 12 or less years of education (unskilled), and those with 13 or more years 
of education (skilled). The remaining productive factors are the capital stock, land used in 
agricultural activities, and a natural resource factor used in the gas extraction and mining 
sectors. The institutional accounts include four representative households (i.e, the private 
-14- 
 
domestic institutions): (1) urban non-indigenous, (2) urban indigenous, (3) rural non-
indigenous, and (4) rural indigenous. The other institutions are the government and the rest 
of the world. The tax accounts have been disaggregated into four taxes showed in Table 
3.1. Lastly, the SAM identifies savings, private and public investment, and a stock change 
accounts. 
Table 3.1: Bolivia SAM 2006 Accounts 
Sectors (19) Sectors (19) -- cont. Factors (5)
Primary Services Unskilled labor
Agriculture Electricity, gas and water Skilled labor
Livestock Construction Capital
Other primary Trade Land
Mining Transport Natural resource
Communications
Manufactures Restaurants and hotels Taxes (4)
Meat Public administration Commodity taxes
Other food Other services Activity taxes
Beverages and tobbaco Tariffs
Textiles Institutions (6) Income taxes
Petroleum refinery Households
Metal and metal products Urban non-indigenous Savings-Investment (4)
Other manufactures Urban indigenous Savings
Rural non-indigenous Investment
Rural indigenous Private investment
Government Public investment
Rest of the world Stock change
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
Table A.1 in Appendix A shows the estimated macro-sam. Bolivia GDP reached 
89,157,704 million bolivianos in 2006 (see Table 3.2). In 2006, the government current 
account surplus was around 11% of GDP and government current and capital demand was 
14.7 and 6.4 per cent of GDP, respectively. The sectoral composition of private and public 
investment demand is different. For private (public) investment, construction represents 
32% (71%) of total investment demand. 
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Table 3.2: Bolivia GDP 2006 (billions bolivianos) 
 
indicator LCU shr% GDP
Household consumption 56,429 63.3
Fixed investment -- private 5,762 6.5
Fixed investment -- public 5,721 6.4
Stock change -718 -0.8
Government consumption 13,140 14.7
Exports 37,943 42.6
Imports -29,118 -32.7
GDP market price 89,158 100.0
Net indirect taxes 19,425 21.8
GDP at factor cost 69,733 78.2
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.  
The production and trade structure of Bolivia is reflected in tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 3.4 show the share of each sector in total exports and imports, 
respectively. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3.4 present, for each sector, the share of 
exports in production and the share of imports in consumption, respectively. While the 
mining (particularly, gas) products represent a significant share of export revenue (around 
61%), their share in total value added is about 14%. The Bolivian 2006 SAM reports taxes 
paid by institutions, commodity sales, activities, and tariffs. The different tax instruments 
and their share in total revenue are summarized in Table A.2 in Appendix A; total tax 
revenue reached 28% of GDP in 2006, while taxes on mining represented 38% of total tax 
revenue. The distribution of income and consumption between our four representative 
households can be found in Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
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Table 3.3: Production Structure Bolivia 2006 (%) 
factor share in value added
f-lab-unsk f-lab-sk f-cap f-land f-natres Total
Agriculture 9.5 61.1 7.3 18.3 13.2 100.0
Livestock 3.5 56.2 6.7 18.9 18.1 100.0
Other primary 1.0 45.0 5.4 28.9 20.7 100.0
Mining 14.2 19.2 11.9 46.9 22.1 100.0
Meat 1.9 19.4 14.3 66.3 100.0
Other food 3.4 24.7 18.1 57.2 100.0
Beverages and tobbaco 1.8 16.3 12.0 71.7 100.0
Textiles 1.4 41.5 11.4 47.1 100.0
Oil refining 2.1 22.7 14.0 63.3 100.0
Metal and metal products 0.2 43.7 20.6 35.7 100.0
Other manufactures 3.9 38.3 13.4 48.4 100.0
Electricity, gas and water 3.0 5.8 19.7 74.5 100.0
Construction 2.3 36.2 15.2 48.5 100.0
Trade 8.1 40.6 16.3 43.1 100.0
Transport 11.0 48.3 9.7 42.0 100.0
Communications 2.1 2.0 6.7 91.3 100.0
Restaurants and hotels 3.3 35.4 10.5 54.1 100.0
Public administration 14.4 14.7 64.7 20.6 100.0
Other services 13.1 17.0 52.7 30.4 100.0
Total 100.0 30.2 24.8 39.8 2.1 3.1 100.0
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.
sector
act shr in 
VA
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Table 3.4: Trade Structure of Bolivia 2006 (%) 
exports% imports% ex intensity im intensity
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Agriculture 2.1 2.8 7.3 7.3
Livestock 0.3 0.1 2.8 1.0
Other primary 0.3 0.1 7.9 1.8
Mining 60.9 0.1 76.6 0.3
Meat 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.0
Other food 11.1 3.8 30.4 9.8
Beverages and tobbaco 0.6 1.0 5.7 6.5
Textil 2.9 4.6 32.4 33.9
Oil refining 1.1 7.6 8.1 21.4
Metal and metal products 6.2 37.1 45.7 72.9
Other manufactures 5.4 23.7 26.7 51.2
Transport 4.5 8.8 11.8 16.5
Communications 1.0 0.6 13.3 6.2
Restaurants and hotels 2.1 3.0 15.8 15.5
Other services 1.2 6.3 2.7 9.3
Total 100.0 100.0 28.7 22.0
References:
Exports% = share of each sector in total exports
Imports% = share of each sector in total imports
EX intensity = share of exports in production
IM intensity = share of imports in consumption
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.
sector
 
Apart from the SAM, our CGE model database includes production, trade, and 
consumption elasticities; the values were drawn from own estimations, Annabi et al. 
(2006), and Decaluwé et al. (2009) (see Appendix A). 
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Table 3.5: Income Composition of Households Bolivia 2006 (%) 
income source
h-urb-
noindig
h-urb-
indig
h-rur-
noindig
h-rur-
indig
Unskilled labor 19.8 30.5 57.4 50.8
Skilled labor 28.0 21.3 10.3 10.1
Capital 36.3 31.5 17.6 15.2
Land 2.2 1.9 1.1 0.9
Natural resource 3.3 2.9 1.6 1.4
Transfers 10.4 11.9 12.0 21.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.  
3.2 Model 
As explained, we implemented the PEP Standard Model. However, we introduced some 
changes in order to better reflect the Bolivian economy. Specifically, we adapted the model 
in order to reflect that Bolivia is a price taker in world markets; producers can always sell 
as much as they wish on the world market at the (exogenous) current price; alternatively, 
we introduced the ―pure‖ form of the small-country hypothesis. In some cases (see below 
the ―edem-txt‖ scenario), we want to simulate a decrease in world export demand without 
altering the world export price. This is achieved by making selected export quantities 
exogenous and deleting the CET tangency condition for export and domestic sales. 
Additionally, we have modified the functioning of the government sector: (1) we assume 
that government consumption of each commodity is fixed in real terms, instead of 
assuming that total government spending in commodities is fixed, and (2) we differentiate 
between private and public investment. Consequently, we can simulate increases in 
government current and capital spending. Finally, we introduced a wage curve (see 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) to endogenize unemployment; it establishes a negative 
relationship between the levels of unemployment and wages.
5
 The wage curve was 
calibrated using the 2006 Bolivian Household Survey. The initial levels of unemployment 
                                               
5 According to David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald, the wage curve summarizes the fact that ―A worker 
who is employed in an area of high unemployment earns less than an identical individual who works in a 
region with low joblessness‖. 
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for unskilled and skilled workers are 3.9 and 10.5%, respectively. A more detailed 
presentation of the changes to the PEP Standard Model can be found in Appendix B. 
As usual in the CGE context, we need to specify the equilibrating mechanism for three 
macroeconomic balances: i) external balance, ii) savings-investment, and iii) government 
budget. The model allows for alternative closure rules for these balances. We assume that 
the government current account is equilibrated through changes in government savings; real 
government consumption and investment spending and all tax rates are fixed. The real 
private investment is endogenous and follows the available savings (i.e., the model is 
savings-driven); thus, a change in the households income will be reflected in a change in 
private investment. The foreign savings (i.e., the negative of the current account balance) 
are fixed in the base scenario value, being the real exchange rate the variable that 
equilibrates the inflows and outflows of foreign currency. Finally, the model numeraire is 
the (nominal) exchange rate.  
4. Simulations 
In this section we use the modified PEP Standard Model to perform counterfactual 
simulations. Two sets of scenarios are considered: in the first, we run simulations related to 
external shocks intended to analyze the impact of the GFC in the Bolivian economy; in the 
second, we assess the impact of some policy responses. 
4.1 Scenarios 
As explained in Section 2, we simulate scenarios related to the following variables:  
(1) world prices of main export products (i.e., mining and agriculture),  
(2) export demand of textiles, and  
(3) remittances from abroad (e.g., Spain, Argentina and the United States). 
As shown in Table 4.1, the first scenario is a 25% reduction in the export price of mining 
(see scenario pwe-min), in accordance with the export price index computed by the Central 
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Bank of Bolivia.
6
 The second scenario (i.e., pwe-agr) simulates a 16% reduction in the 
export price of agriculture, that corresponds to the highest monthly variation registered 
between September and October of 2008. The 40% decrease in the world export demand of 
textiles (see scenario edem-txt) matches the fall in exports that the textile sector 
experienced between 2008 and 2009. This simulation is meant to capture, along with the 
effects of the GFC, the elimination of the tariff preferences that the USA granted to Bolivia 
under the ATPDEA (for its initials in Spanish). The ATPDEA included import duties 
preferences for several products, but the main products that Bolivia exported under these 
preferences were textiles. According to Jemio and Nina (2009), a 50% decrease in 
remittances would cause a 2.8% decrease in GDP. In the remit scenario this hypothesis is 
evaluated by simulating a 17% reduction in transfers from the rest of the world to 
households. The size of the shock corresponds to the decrease in remittances observed 
between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2009. Finally, we simulate a 
combined scenario (combi) in which all previous shocks are considered together; this 
corresponds to our ―crisis‖ scenario. 
Table 4.1: Simulated Scenarios 
 
name description
External shocks
pwe-min 25% reduction in world export price of mining
pwe-agr 16% reduction in world export price of agriculture
edem-txt 40% reduction in world export demand of textiles
remit 17% reduction in remittances to all households
combi all previous scenarios combined
External shocks + Policy shocks
combi-trnsfr combi + 10% increase in transfers from gov to hhd
combi-spnd combi + 5% increase in government consumption
+ 9% increase in government investment
Source: Authors’ elaboration.  
                                               
6 Notice that the mining sector in the SAM contains the hydrocarbon sector. The price index computed by the 
Central Bank of Bolivia shows a 22% reduction between 2006 and 2008. 
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4.2 Results 
In this subsection, we describe and analyze the macroeconomic and sectoral results 
obtained from the CGE simulations. As explained before, the starting point for our 
simulations is a picture of the Bolivian economy in the year 2006.  
Table 4.2 shows the percentage change of the main (real) macroeconomic variables. In 
particular, we present results for aggregate demand and supply, price indices, 
unemployment, and fiscal variables. Column (i) shows base year data, where GDP 
components are expressed in billions of bolivianos (i.e., the local currency unit) for the year 
2006. Columns (ii)-(viii) present the percentage change with respect to the base scenario. 
The last two columns refer to the policy response scenarios that will be explained later. 
Notice that in neither of the simulations there is a change in government consumption, 
because it is considered an exogenous variable – recall the model closure rule explained in 
Section 3. 
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Table 4.2: Real Macro Indicators (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
base LCU pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
National accounts (chg%)
Household consumption 56,429 -4.9 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3 -6.7 -6.3 -6.1
Fixed investment 11,482 -46.3 -0.1 -0.1 -3.0 -49.9 -51.7 -56.9
Government consumption 13,140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0
Exports 37,943 -3.7 -0.1 -0.5 1.2 -2.7 -2.9 -3.6
Imports -29,118 -20.6 -0.5 -0.7 -2.0 -23.4 -23.6 -24.6
GDP market price 89,158 -3.9 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -4.2 -4.2 -4.0
Net indirect taxes 19,425 -13.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -13.7 -13.7 -14.1
GDP factor cost 69,733 -1.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -1.5 -1.5 -1.2
Price indices (100=base)
Consumer price index 100.0 92.3 99.6 99.5 99.0 90.5 90.7 91.2
Domestic price index (*) 100.0 90.5 99.6 99.5 98.9 88.6 88.7 89.2
Terms of trade (pe/pm) 100.0 84.5 99.6 100.0 100.0 84.1 84.1 84.1
World price index (**) 100.0 84.5 99.6 100.0 100.0 84.1 84.1 84.1
Real exchange rate 100.0 100.8 100.2 100.5 101.1 102.7 102.6 102.0
Unemployment (%)
Unskilled labor 3.9 4.6 4.1 4.0 3.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Skilled labor 10.5 12.9 10.6 10.6 10.7 13.2 13.1 11.8
Total 7.0 8.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 8.8 8.8 8.1
Fiscal (shr% GDP)
Government savings 11.0 7.6 11.1 11.1 11.0 7.8 7.4 6.5
Tax revenue 28.1 26.2 28.2 28.2 28.1 26.4 26.4 26.1
Government consumption 14.7 15.9 14.7 14.7 14.7 15.9 15.9 16.9
Government investment 6.4 6.8 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.3
note: the nominal exchange rate is the numeraire
(*) = non-tradables
(**) = tradables
Source: Authors’ calculations.
indicator
 
Not surprisingly, the largest impact on real GDP at factor cost appears when there is a 
reduction in the export price of mining, GDP decreases by 1.3%. This result is due to the 
large share of the mining sector in total exports (i.e., 61%; see Table 3.4) and total value 
added (14%).
7
 The other non-combined scenarios show negative but small effects on real 
GDP at factor cost.  
                                               
7 The rates of GDP growth above 6% experienced in 2008 were mainly explained by the boost in the mining 
sector. 
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In terms of total household consumption, it decreases by 4.9% and 0.2% in the pwe-min 
and pwe-agr scenarios, respectively. Again, this is a reflection of the importance of the 
mining sector as a source of income, In terms of the four representative households 
identified in the SAM, the largest impact is observed for the urban indigenous and non-
indigenous households, who are the main recipients of income from the mining sector (see 
Table C.1 in Appendix C). The decline in remittances (remit scenario) also has a negative 
impact on total private consumption; it is reduced by 1.3% when remittances fall by 17%, 
although the impact on GDP is relatively small (-0.1%). 
According to macroeconomic data, a structural problem of the Bolivian economy is 
certainly the high volatility of investment, which is reflected in our assumption that 
investment is savings-driven (see above). In the pwe-min scenario, fixed investment falls 
by -46.3%. There are two main channels that explain this outcome. First, a reduction in the 
export price of mining leads to a decrease in the production of mining with the 
corresponding reduction in revenues from indirect taxes imposed on this sector -- as said 
before, mining (particularly, natural gas) is a highly taxed sector. Therefore, fiscal surplus 
shrinks and government savings decreases from 11% to 7.6% as a share of GDP – see the 
last four rows of Table 4.2. In fact, the GDP share of tax revenues reduces from 28.1% to 
26.2% in the pwe-min scenario.
8
 Second, unemployment increases from 7% to 8.4%, 
affecting wages negatively. As a consequence, households’ income and savings also go 
down. These two channels reduce the available savings and -- consequently – private 
investment. 
As expected, exports drop when there is a decrease in the price of mining. This, in turn, 
generates a depreciation of the real exchange rate that, ceteris paribus, increases exports of 
non-mining products and decreases imports (-20.6%) in order to keep foreign savings fixed; 
recall that foreign savings are fixed as part of the model macro closure rule for the external 
sector (see above). The real exchange rate depreciation is similar but less strong in the pwe-
agr and edem-txt scenarios. 
                                               
8 Notice that government income from hydrocarbons increased from 5.6% of GDP in 2004 to 25.7% of GDP 
in the last quarter of 2008. 
-24- 
 
The decrease in remittances has a negative impact on households and government income 
and savings (see scenario remit). Again, less savings translates into less investment (-3%) 
due to the selected savings-investment closure rule. The income effect of a reduction in 
remittances differs among our four household categories, being the indigenous urban 
households the most affected -- their consumption decreases by 2.9% --, while indigenous 
rural households are the least affected -- their consumption decreases by -1.9%. This result 
confirms that urban households are more dependent on remittances than rural households. 
Table 4.3 presents changes in the sectoral volumes of production (value added), exports and 
imports. To facilitate the presentation of results, we concentrate on five aggregated sectors: 
mining, agriculture, food, manufactures, and services. Columns (ii) to (viii) show the 
percentage change with respect to the base scenario. Table C.2 in Appendix C presents the 
same set of results but with a greater sector disaggregation. 
Table 4.3: Sectoral Results (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
Aggregated Sectors 
base LCU pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Value added
Agriculture 9,750 2.5 -1.6 0.2 -0.1 0.6 0.7 0.3
Mining 11,346 -12.9 0.4 0.3 0.6 -11.4 -11.5 -12.1
Food 4,939 3.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 3.7 3.8 3.6
Other manufactures 3,866 6.7 0.6 -2.5 0.5 5.6 5.4 4.4
Services 39,832 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 0.5
Exports
Agriculture 1,021 19.7 -25.9 1.3 1.8 -8.5 -8.7 -9.7
Mining 23,536 -19.9 0.4 0.4 0.8 -18.3 -18.4 -18.6
Food 4,492 21.4 1.0 1.3 2.0 27.1 26.7 25.3
Other manufactures 5,514 27.3 1.1 -7.1 1.4 25.0 24.4 22.3
Services 3,380 18.4 1.0 0.9 1.9 23.3 23.0 21.4
Imports
Agriculture 866 -11.8 -0.8 -0.8 -2.1 -15.0 -14.6 -14.1
Mining 2,240 -15.9 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 -17.1 -17.0 -17.2
Food 1,485 -16.1 -1.0 -0.9 -2.8 -20.1 -19.6 -18.8
Other manufactures 19,057 -22.7 -0.3 -0.7 -1.9 -25.3 -25.8 -27.7
Services 5,470 -17.6 -1.0 -0.8 -2.7 -21.5 -21.1 -20.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
indicator
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The production of the mining sector drops by 13% in the pwe-min scenario. In contrast, all 
other sectors, and in particular other manufactures, are positively affected. For instance, the 
food industry increases its production by 3.2%. Two are the main mechanisms that explain 
this result. First, the real exchange rate appreciation favors exports and production of the 
non-mining sector. Second, there are positive input-output effects for the activities that use 
mining products as intermediate inputs.  
At the sectoral level, the decrease in investment described above translates into a decrease 
in construction. According to the SAM, 96% of construction output is demanded for 
investment purposes. Thus, the positive correlation between the output of mining and 
construction reflects the relationship between lower mining world export prices, less 
savings, less investment, and less demand for construction. Furthermore, construction is a 
non-tradable sector which decreases its production due to the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. 
The pwe-agr scenario shows similar effects for the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
In fact, agricultural exports decrease by 26%. In a recent study, Birbuet and Machicado 
(2009) highlight the high sensitivity of agricultural exports to variations in world export 
prices.
9
 In fact, the recent growth in agriculture is largely explained by the high 
international prices of quinoa, Brazilian nuts, soya, rice and vegetable oil. 
In the edem-txt scenario, production of textiles decreases by 12.6%. The resulting real 
exchange rate depreciation – necessary to maintain a fixed current account balance – has a 
positive effect on the production and exports of other sectors. As expected, imports 
decrease for all products.  
The drop in remittances (see remit scenario) has a direct negative impact on the 
consumption and production of agriculture, food and services. On the other hand, 
production of mining and other manufactures (i.e., the more export-intensive sectors) 
increase. At the same time, as a consequence of the real exchange rate depreciation, exports 
of all sectors increase and imports of all sectors decrease. 
                                               
9 The authors focus in the quinoa sector, which has been one of the growing agricultural sectors in recent 
years. 
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Table C.3 of Appendix C presents the changes in sectoral labor demand. As expected, 
sectoral employment is positively correlated with sectoral production. Moreover, demand 
of skilled and unskilled workers moves in similar magnitudes, which reflect our assumption 
of complementarity between both labor categories.
10
  
As was shown, a 40% reduction in the foreign demand of textiles does not have a 
significant impact on GDP. However, there is an important reallocation of workers among 
sectors. In fact, with the ending of the ATPDEA, the demand of both labor categories in the 
textile sector decreases by around 20%. This is close to what was recently observed; labor 
demand in the textile sector decreased in the cities of La Paz and El Alto, but without 
remarkable effects on aggregate output.
11
 
Table 4.4: Factor Returns 
(index base=1) 
scenario f-lab-unsk f-lab-sk f-cap f-land f-natres
base 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
pwe-min 0.907 0.903 0.858 0.933 0.522
pwe-agr 0.991 0.995 0.996 0.969 1.007
edem-txt 0.993 0.995 0.994 0.996 1.006
remit 0.990 0.988 0.989 0.987 1.012
combi 0.882 0.883 0.839 0.883 0.541
combi-trnsfr 0.883 0.885 0.840 0.886 0.539
combi-spnd 0.888 0.901 0.846 0.886 0.532
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Finally, Table 4.4 presents the changes in factor returns. In the pwe-min scenario, capital 
and particularly natural resources are the most negatively affected factors. The average 
return to capital decreases by almost 14%, and the return to natural resources decreases by 
almost 50%. This result is associated with the fact that the mining sector is intensive in 
capital and natural resources, which are treated as sector-specific factors. In the other 
simulations, the fall in the return to unskilled and skilled labor, capital and land, is less than 
                                               
10 Specifically, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor is 0.8. 
11 In 2005, La Paz and El Alto represented 43% of total Bolivian exports to the US under the ATPDEA, and 
these exports were mainly textiles (UDAPE, 2006). 
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2%, except for land in the pwe-agr scenario. As explained below, the changes in factor 
returns help to explain our poverty results.  
4.3 Combined Scenario 
As already mentioned, our combined scenario allows us to assess the impact of all previous 
shocks simulated together. Not surprisingly, Figure 4.1 clearly shows that the main driver 
of the combined scenario results is the drop in the world price of mining. As shown in 
Table 4.2, real GDP declines by 1.5%, while investment and private consumption decrease 
by 50% and 7%, respectively. The drop in the foreign currency inflow -- due to the 
combination of the three external shocks -- induces a real exchange rate depreciation that, 
in turn, decreases imports by 23%. The unemployment rate is strongly affected in this 
scenario; it rises from 7% to 9%, being the skilled labor the most affected (see Table 4.2).  
Figure 4.1: Change in GDP (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0
pwe-min
pwe-agr
edem-txt
remit
combi
 
4.4 Policy Response Scenarios 
In this subsection, two policy response scenarios are considered. Our aim is to assess if the 
government is capable of compensating the negative effects of the GFC. According to 
Weisbrot, Ray and Johnston (2009), the Bolivian government has used fiscal policy to 
-28- 
 
effectively encounter the effects of the world recession. They claim that this would not 
have been possible without the control that the government obtained of the production of 
the natural gas sector. In our model, this mechanism is captured through a high activity tax 
on mining. 
Therefore, we have simulated expansive fiscal policies along with the combined (crisis) 
scenario; i.e., when there is a combination of all the external shocks. First, we consider our 
combined scenario complemented with a 10% increase in transfers from the government to 
households (combi-trnsfr), and second, we consider our combined scenario together with a 
5% increase in government consumption plus a 9% increase in government investment 
(combi-spnd). The size of these two policy responses is in line with what was observed 
during 2009. The results of the simulations are shown in the last columns of all the tables 
above. In what follows, the policy response scenarios are compared to the combined (crisis) 
scenario. 
Our results show that in simulation combi-trnsfr the GDP does not change, while in 
simulation combi-spnd the GDP decrease in somewhat smaller. This is striking because one 
would have expected a better performance of the economy, since the government is 
applying counter cyclical policies. The key to explain these results lies on how the 
government is financing these expansive policies.  
First, observe that there is a crowding out effect: investment decreases 2 and 7 percentage 
points more in the combi-trnsfr and combi-spnd scenarios than in the combi scenario, 
respectively. The reason for the crowding out effect lies in the need to finance the increase 
in government spending using domestic resources. In fact, government surplus is reduced 
0.4 (scenario combi-trnsfr) and 1.3 (scenario combi-spnd) percentage points more than in 
the crisis (combi) scenario. On the other hand, there is a positive effect on household 
consumption, which shows a smaller decrease; i.e., compare -6.7% with -6.3% and -6.1%. 
Second, unemployment of unskilled workers is not reduced with any of the two policy 
response measures. In contrast, unemployment of skilled workers is reduced, particularly 
when the government increases its current and capital consumption. In fact, Table C.2 
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shows an increase in the production of government services, which is intensive in skilled 
labor. 
In sum, the high government dependence on the mining (particularly, natural gas) sector as 
a source of financing could constrain its capacity to respond to the negative effects of 
external shocks. 
4.5 Poverty Results 
The results in terms of poverty at the micro level are calculated by linking the CGE model 
to a simple microsimulation technique – clearly, these are rough poverty estimates. The two 
are used in a sequential ―top-down‖ fashion: the CGE communicates with the 
microsimulation model by generating a vector of changes in the real income for each 
representative household. The Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH), the main household 
survey in Bolivia, is used to build the microsimulation model. At the micro level, a 
counterfactual household per cápita income distribution is generated; the change in the real 
income of each representative household is applied to the corresponding individuals in the 
household survey. Subsequently, we estimate new poverty indicators. 
The two shocks that drive the poverty results in the crisis (combi) scenario are the drop in 
the world export price of mining (pwe-min) and the decline in remittances (remit). The 
other two external shocks have a negligible – although negative – effect on poverty. The 
national moderate (extreme) poverty headcount ratio increases 2.9 (2.3) percentage points 
in the crisis scenario. The increase in moderate and extreme poverty is larger for the urban 
indigenous and non-indigenous households, consistent with the changes in consumption 
described above. The policy response scenarios combi-trnsfr and combi-spnd show a slight 
decrease in poverty compared to the crisis scenario.  
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Table 4.5: Poverty Impact of Simulations 
(headcount ratio -- official poverty lines) 
indicator
base pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
Poverty
national 60.0 62.3 60.0 60.0 60.7 62.9 62.9 62.7
h-urb-noindig 47.2 49.9 47.2 47.2 47.8 50.5 50.5 50.3
h-urb-indig 54.4 58.1 54.5 54.4 55.9 59.0 58.8 58.6
h-rur-noindig 76.9 78.0 76.9 76.9 76.9 78.8 78.8 78.8
h-rur-indig 77.4 78.2 77.4 77.4 77.8 78.4 78.3 78.4
Extreme poverty
national 37.5 39.3 37.5 37.5 37.8 39.8 39.7 39.7
h-urb-noindig 18.8 21.3 18.8 18.8 19.4 21.7 21.7 21.7
h-urb-indig 28.5 30.4 28.5 28.5 28.7 31.4 31.4 31.3
h-rur-noindig 54.2 56.1 54.2 54.2 54.2 56.1 56.1 56.1
h-rur-indig 67.7 68.1 67.7 67.7 67.8 68.3 68.2 68.3
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
As explained, the results obtained from our CGE model are based on a set of assumptions. 
Specifically, we have run all the simulations assigning certain values to the supply and 
demand elasticities. In Appendix D we present a sensitivity analysis of model results with 
respect to the values chosen for the different elasticities. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Bolivia has experienced in recent years an important commodity price boom, which has 
significantly increased its external revenues. This export boom has permitted the country to 
reverse chronic fiscal and external deficits, and accumulate foreign exchange reserves up to 
a level never seen before. In addition, the growth forecasts for 2009 allocated the Bolivian 
economy with the highest rate of growth in the western hemisphere. 
However, with the outbreak of the GFC, export revenues fell as a consequence of the 
reduction in world export prices of mining, agriculture and food commodities, but they are 
still at historically high levels. In this paper, we have quantitatively analyzed the impact of 
the GFC on the main macroeconomic variables and on sectoral variables as production, 
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exports, and imports. In general, we have found that the GFC could have mild effects on 
the Bolivian economy, except when there is a drop in the world export price of mining.  
It seems that the boom occurred in previous years had furnished the Bolivian economy with 
a greater capacity to undertake counter-cyclical policies to ameliorate the future negative 
effects of the GFC. However there are some important risks that the economy will face in 
the future, some related to the GFC and some not.  
First, investment rates, in particular private investment will continue to be at very low 
levels, undermining future growth and employment creation. The results showed that total 
investment will fall by -50% in the crisis scenario. Undoubtedly, the FDI necessary to 
obtain capital and technology will not flow to Bolivia, impeding the adequate exploitation 
of natural resources and promoting growth in other sectors, in particular in the 
manufacturing ones. Bolivia will continue exporting raw materials. 
Second, the fiscal surplus experienced in these years has ended and long term fiscal 
sustainability is in risk as it depends on hydrocarbons revenues. Due to the GFC and to low 
investments in this sector, hydrocarbon reserves and production and fiscal revenues are 
expected to decline. Government savings fell to 7.6% of GDP when there is a fall in the 
export price of mining. We claim that, external revenues will fall not only due to the GFC, 
but also due to a supply constraint in Bolivia’s production.  
Third, remittances will not recover their growing performance and in the best case they will 
remain stable. By simulating a reduction of 17% in remittances we have shown that not 
only consumption, but also investment will be affected. This will reduce aggregate demand 
and income with negative consequences for poverty. In fact, poverty will increase by 0.7 
percentage points and extreme poverty by 0.3 percentage points.  
Finally, it seems that the policy response of the government to the crisis, based on 
increasing transfers and/or increasing government consumption and investment, has not the 
counter-cyclical effects that would have been expected. Nevertheless, we have not explored 
non-domestic sources of financing for those transfers and consumption expenditures. It is 
possible, for example, that these transfers could be financed by progressive taxes or by 
external debt. In these cases, the effects on poverty will be certainly different.  
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Appendix A: SAM and Elasticities 
Table A.1: Bolivia MACROSAM 2006 (billions bolivianos) 
act com f-lab f-cap hhd gov row t-act t-com t-iva t-imp t-dir s-i dstk total
act 144,720 144,720
com 74,721 56,635 13,170 37,997 11,505 -718 193,309
f-lab 24,061 270 24,331
f-cap 45,938 1,491 47,429
hhd 24,271 41,786 2,940 6,084 75,081
gov 156 703 12,981 5,597 852 5,673 25,962
row 29,159 60 5,643 497 90 35,450
t-act 0
t-com 12,981 12,981
t-iva 5,597 5,597
t-imp 852 852
t-dir 5,673 5,673
s-i 12,120 9,762 -11,096 10,787
dstk -718 -718
total 144,720 193,309 24,331 47,429 75,081 25,962 35,450 0 12,981 5,597 852 5,673 10,787 -718
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.  
Table A.2: Taxes Included in the CGE Model 
tax instrument tax-rev$ shr-tax-rev shr-gdp
Income taxes 564.8 22.5 6.3
Activity taxes 961.5 38.4 10.8
Commodity taxes 893.0 35.6 10.0
Tariffs 87.9 3.5 1.0
Total 2,507.2 100.0 28.1
References:
tax-rev$ = tax revenue in LCU
shr-tax-rev = share of tax revenue in total tax revenue
shr-GDP = share of tax revenue in GDP
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.  
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Table A.3: Consumption and Income Distribution Bolivia 2006 (%) 
h-urb-
noindig
h-urb-
indig
h-rur-
noindig
h-rur-
indig
Consumption 35.2 24.5 21.5 18.8 100.0
Agriculture 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Livestock 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Other primary 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Mining
Meat 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Other food 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Beverages and tobbaco 28.9 27.5 11.1 32.5 100.0
Textiles 45.1 29.1 8.1 17.7 100.0
Oil refining 47.0 1.6 0.3 51.2 100.0
Metal and metal products 22.9 29.3 36.8 11.0 100.0
Other manufactures 22.9 29.3 36.8 11.0 100.0
Electricity, gas and water 37.8 17.7 42.5 2.0 100.0
Construction
Trade
Transport 44.1 38.9 5.2 11.7 100.0
Communications 48.4 25.8 13.0 12.8 100.0
Restaurants and hotels 37.8 17.7 42.5 2.0 100.0
Public administration 37.8 17.7 42.5 2.0 100.0
Other services 37.8 17.7 42.5 2.0 100.0
Income 52.0 33.3 4.8 9.9 100.0
Unskilled labor 36.4 35.9 9.7 17.9 100.0
Skilled labor 63.0 30.6 2.1 4.3 100.0
Capital 59.5 33.1 2.6 4.8 100.0
Land 59.5 33.1 2.6 4.8 100.0
Natural resource 59.5 33.1 2.6 4.8 100.0
Transfers 44.7 32.9 4.7 17.7 100.0
Source: Bolivia SAM 2006.
households
total
 
Elasticities 
The income elasticities and Frisch parameters were estimated using the 2007 Bolivian 
Household Survey; it records income and consumption data. We estimated logarithmic 
commodity-wise expenditure demand function using the OLS method, 
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     ihhihih cantmiemgastotcon   210 loglog  (A.1) 
where con(i,h) is consumption of commodity i in household h, gastot(i,h) is total 
consumption expenditure of household h, cantmiem(h) is the household size, epsilon is a 
random term, and b1 is the parameter of interest.  
The LES functions in the CGE model assume that total household consumption takes place 
within an income/expenditure (budget) constraint; total household consumption expenditure 
is equal to total household income after taxes and savings. This adding-up restriction was 
imposed by means of computing the gastot variable as the sum of all household 
consumption expenditures recorded in the household survey. Equation (A.1) was estimated 
for seven commodities, using two samples of 2,626 and 1,274 urban and rural households, 
respectively.
12
 The estimation results are presented in Table A.4, where all the expenditure 
elasticities of demand are positive and statistically different from zero at 5 % or lower 
significance levels. We found that income elasticities are relatively lower for food and 
textiles, and higher for other manufactures and other services. Table A.5 shows the 
estimated Frisch parameters.
13
  
Table A.4a: Income Elasticities Urban Households 
(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11) (13)
VARIABLES food comunic othmnf othsvc oilref textil transp
lgastot 0.483 *** 0.526 *** 1.107 *** 1.559 *** 0.707 *** 0.768 *** 0.505 ***
(0.0263) (0.0493) (0.0248) (0.0446) (0.0992) (0.0339) (0.0355)
cantmiem 0.0956 *** -0.0462 ** -0.000662 -0.0469 *** -0.0691 ** -0.000718 0.0252 **
(0.00841) (0.0211) (0.00921) (0.0165) (0.0306) (0.0121) (0.0115)
Constant 1.929 *** 0.125 -2.414 *** -6.061 *** -0.410 -0.206 0.585 **
(0.188) (0.351) (0.167) (0.311) (0.669) (0.237) (0.251)
Observations 2,626 776 2,621 2,128 391 1,722 2,122
R-squared 0.355 0.148 0.530 0.430 0.218 0.306 0.154
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
                                               
12 Then, these seven commodities were mapped to the 19 commodities in the CGE model. 
13 The Frisch parameters measure the household-specific elasticity of the marginal utility of income with 
respect to income. The available evidence suggests that the Frisch parameter varies systematically with the 
level of per-capita income (see Lluch, Powell and Williams, 1977). 
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Table A.4b: Income Elasticities Rural Households 
(2) (4) (6) (8) (10) (12) (14)
VARIABLES food comunic othmnf othsvc oilref textil transp
lgastot 0.663 *** 0.553 *** 1.116 *** 1.423 *** 0.628 ** 0.773 *** 0.486 ***
(0.0273) (0.118) (0.0561) (0.106) (0.245) (0.0691) (0.0530)
cantmiem 0.0262 ** -0.0555 0.0424 ** -0.113 ** 0.0562 -0.0452 * 0.00715
(0.0113) (0.0383) (0.0184) (0.0443) (0.0679) (0.0265) (0.0206)
Constant 1.448 *** -0.464 -3.308 *** -5.527 *** -0.593 -0.166 0.233
(0.165) (0.786) (0.367) (0.698) (1.874) (0.494) (0.356)
Observations 1,274 335 1,247 605 72 700 839
R-squared 0.532 0.135 0.407 0.313 0.217 0.233 0.184
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Table A.5: Frisch Parameter 
hosehold frisch
Urban non-indigenous -4.3
Urban indigenous -5.1
Rural non-indigenous -5.8
Rural indigenous -6.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
In the PEP Standard Model household savings are a linear function of disposable income; 
this allows for the marginal propensity to save, to be different from the average propensity 
(see equation (16) in Decaluwe et al (2009)). In our case, rural households show negative 
savings. As consequence, for those households the intercept is negative, while the slope 
(the marginal propensity) is positive. The marginal propensity to save was estimated at the 
national level using savings and income data for the period 1970-2008. The estimated value 
is 0.231.  
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Appendix B: Changes to the PEP Standard Model 
International Trade 
In the PEP 1-1 Standard Model, the world demand for exports of product x is 
 
XD
x
FOB
x
x
xx
PE
PWXe
EXDOEXD








.
 (64) 
In case XDx , equation (64) simplifies to 
 FOBxx PEPWXe .  (64’) 
which represents the ―pure‖ form of the small-country hypothesis; producers can always 
sell as much as they wish on the world market at the (exogenous) current price, xPWX . 
To simulate a change in the world export demand of a given commodity exported by a 
given industry keeping the small country assumption (see scenario edem-txt), we introduce 
the following changes to the model: (1) again, replace equation (64) by (64’), and (2) 
replace equation (63) (i.e., the relative supply of exports and local commodity) by equation 
(63’) for the selected commodity and industry pair(s), 
 xjxj EXOEX ,,   (63’) 
Government Consumption 
In the PEP Standard Model, government consumption of commodity i is determined by the 
following equation (see equation (56) in Decaluwé et al. (2009)).  
 GCGPC GVTiii   (56) 
with g (i.e., current government expenditures on goods and services) fixed and equal to its 
initial value (i.e., GOG  ). As an alternative, we modified the government behavior 
assuming that the real government spending is fixed (i.e., all the iCG  variables) while G  is 
endogenous. Specifically, we dropped equation (56) from the model and added equations 
(56’) and (56’’), 
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 ii CGOCG   (56’) 
 
i
iiCGPCG  (56’’) 
Private and Public Investment 
The PEP Standard Model does not make a difference between private and public 
investment. Consequently, it does not allow simulating the impact of an increase in public 
investment when the model is savings-driven. In order to model public investment as 
different from private investment, we have modified equations 54, 55, 89, 92, 98 and 
WALRAS in the original model. In addition, we have added equations (INVG1)-(INVG4) 
and the variables  
 iINVG  public investment demand of commodity i,  
 iINVTOT  total investment demand of commodity i (private + public), 
 ITPUB  total public investment expenditures, and 
 ITTOT  total investment expenditures. 
Notice that the original model variable IT now refers to total private investment 
expenditures. In equation (89’) i1 is a subset of i, including all commodities but the one in 
iref (see equation (WALRAS’)). 
 
i
iiVSTKPCITTOTGFCF  (54’) 
 ITINVPC INViii   (55’) 
 
111
11,11
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ii
h
hii
MRGNDITVSTK
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 SROWSGSFSHITTOT
f
f
h
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irefirefiref
irefiref
h
hirefiref
MRGNDITVSTK
INVTOTCGCQLEON

  ,
 (WALRAS’) 
Equation (INVG1) calculates the quantity of commodity i for public investment demand. It 
is assumed that the commodity composition of public investment does not change; if public 
investment increases (i.e., an increase in invgadj), the public investment demand of every 
commodity is increased by the same proportion. Equation (INVG2) computes total 
investment demand of commodity i. Equation (INVG3) compute the total government 
investment expenditure. From equation (INVG4), the total private investment expenditure 
(IT) is computed. 
 invgadjinvgINVG ii   (INVG1) 
 iii INVGINVINVTOT   (INVG2) 
 
i
ii INVGPCITPUB  (INVG3) 
 
i
iiVSTKPCITPUBITITTOT  (INVG4) 
Wage Curve 
The PEP Standard Model assumes full employment of the labor force. As explained above, 
we introduced endogenous unemployment by means of a wage curve. Specifically, we add 
to the model equation (WC) and the endogenous variable UERAT (unemployment rate). 
The value of the phillips parameter (i.e., the wage curve elasticity) was set at 0.10 based on 
international evidence documented in Blanchflower and Oswald (2005). 
-42- 
 
 





 11
l
l
l
l
l
UERATO
UERAT
phillips
PIXCONO
WO
PIXCON
W
 (WC) 
Appendix C: Additional Results 
Table C.1: Consumption Results (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
representative 
household base pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
h-urb-noindig 1,984 -15.0 -0.7 -0.6 -2.8 -18.8 -18.3 -17.2
h-urb-indig 1,385 -13.8 -0.8 -0.6 -2.9 -17.8 -17.3 -16.5
h-rur-noindig 1,216 -8.4 -0.5 -0.5 -1.3 -10.6 -10.3 -9.9
h-rur-indig 1,059 -9.3 -0.6 -0.5 -1.9 -12.1 -11.4 -11.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table C.2: Sectoral Results (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
base LCU pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Value added
Agriculture 661.8 4.6 -2.1 0.3 0.0 2.4 2.5 2.2
Livestock 243.8 -2.2 -0.8 -0.1 -0.6 -4.0 -3.9 -4.2
Other primary 69.3 -1.6 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.9 -1.7
Mining 986.8 -15.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 -13.6 -13.7 -14.3
Meat 133.8 -2.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -3.1 -2.8 -2.7
Other food 235.8 7.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 9.2 9.2 8.7
Beverages and tobbaco 124.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 -0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7
Textiles 100.0 3.7 0.3 -11.4 0.1 -8.3 -8.2 -8.2
Oil refining 147.8 2.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 2.6 2.7 2.6
Metal and metal products 13.2 53.8 1.3 1.5 0.9 62.0 60.0 53.4
Other manufactures 273.4 5.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 8.0 7.7 6.6
Electricity, gas and water 210.9 -2.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -3.6 -3.4 -3.2
Construction 157.9 -26.9 0.0 0.0 -1.6 -29.1 -30.3 -30.2
Trade 563.0 5.7 0.0 -0.4 0.2 5.8 5.7 4.9
Transport 764.5 3.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 3.7 3.7 3.3
Communications 144.5 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.5
Restaurants and hotels 226.8 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4
Public administration 1,001.6 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.4 4.3
Other services 914.1 -2.0 0.0 0.1 -0.7 -2.7 -2.6 -2.6
Exports
Agriculture 80.0 20.3 -29.0 1.3 1.9 -11.7 -11.9 -12.9
Livestock 11.8 17.0 -28.6 1.1 1.7 -14.0 -14.2 -15.1
Other primary 10.3 18.0 1.3 1.1 1.7 23.2 22.9 21.9
Mining 2,310.1 -19.8 0.4 0.4 0.8 -18.2 -18.2 -18.5
Meat 3.9 18.9 1.1 1.2 2.1 24.3 24.0 22.7
Other food 422.9 21.7 1.0 1.3 2.0 27.4 27.1 25.6
Beverages and tobbaco 22.3 16.6 0.9 0.8 2.0 21.1 20.7 19.5
Textiles 111.8 0.0 0.0 -40.0 0.0 -40.0 -40.0 -40.0
Oil refining 43.5 -27.0 0.6 0.6 1.3 -25.1 -25.1 -25.2
Metal and metal products 234.5 47.3 1.4 1.5 1.9 56.2 55.0 51.2
Other manufactures 205.1 19.4 1.2 1.1 1.7 24.8 24.5 23.2
Transport 172.6 18.8 1.1 0.9 1.6 23.6 23.3 22.1
Communications 38.1 14.8 0.4 0.5 2.3 18.3 17.8 16.5
Restaurants and hotels 81.1 19.3 1.2 1.0 2.3 25.1 24.6 23.1
Other services 46.2 18.6 1.0 1.0 1.8 23.3 23.0 20.3
Imports
Agriculture 80.1 -11.2 -0.8 -0.8 -2.1 -14.3 -13.9 -13.4
Livestock 4.2 -19.7 -1.1 -1.3 -3.0 -24.2 -23.8 -23.5
Other primary 2.2 -20.7 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4 -23.1 -23.2 -23.9
Mining 2.3 -31.3 0.5 0.5 -0.4 -30.2 -30.8 -33.0
Meat 6.9 -19.5 -1.3 -1.5 -3.5 -24.9 -24.2 -23.3
Other food 111.1 -16.3 -1.0 -1.0 -2.7 -20.4 -19.8 -19.0
Beverages and tobbaco 30.5 -14.5 -0.8 -0.7 -2.8 -18.3 -17.8 -16.9
Textiles 134.3 -13.1 -0.9 -6.7 -2.3 -20.4 -20.0 -18.9
Oil refining 221.8 -15.8 -0.2 -0.2 -1.1 -17.0 -16.8 -17.0
Metal and metal products 1,080.7 -31.9 -0.2 -0.1 -2.2 -34.2 -35.1 -38.3
Other manufactures 690.6 -10.3 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 -12.3 -12.3 -12.7
Transport 257.7 -14.5 -0.9 -0.8 -1.7 -17.5 -17.3 -17.0
Communications 18.1 -16.1 -0.5 -0.5 -3.0 -19.3 -18.8 -17.7
Restaurants and hotels 87.8 -21.7 -1.3 -1.0 -4.3 -27.4 -26.7 -25.2
Other services 183.3 -20.0 -1.0 -0.9 -3.3 -24.5 -24.0 -22.1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Table C.3: Labor Demand (change% w.r.t. base scenario) 
Selected Sectors 
base LCU pwe-min pwe-agr
edem-
txt remit combi
combi-
trnsfr
combi-
spnd
Unskilled labor
Agriculture 404.5 6.8 -3.0 0.5 0.0 3.5 3.7 3.3
Mining 189.1 -40.8 1.5 1.2 2.1 -37.2 -37.5 -38.6
Textiles 41.5 6.9 0.7 -20.4 0.2 -15.1 -15.0 -14.7
Construction 57.2 -45.4 0.1 0.0 -3.1 -48.4 -50.0 -49.7
Trade 228.8 10.1 0.1 -0.7 0.3 10.4 10.2 9.1
Skilled labor
Agriculture 48.4 7.2 -3.3 0.3 0.2 3.5 3.6 2.1
Mining 117.1 -40.6 1.2 1.1 2.3 -37.2 -37.5 -39.3
Textiles 11.4 7.3 0.4 -20.5 0.4 -15.1 -15.1 -15.7
Construction 24.1 -45.2 -0.3 -0.1 -3.0 -48.5 -50.1 -50.3
Trade 91.5 10.5 -0.3 -0.8 0.4 10.3 10.1 7.9
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Appendix D: Sensitivity Analysis with respect to Elasticities 
In our sensitivity analysis we follow the methodology proposed by Vinod and Harrison 
(1992), which comprises the following steps: 
1. we assume that each elasticity is uniformly distributed in the interval [-0.8 central 
value,+0.8 central value], 
2. randomly select the value for each elasticity, 
3. calibrate the model using the selected elasticities, 
4. simulate counterfactual scenarios – repeat steps (2)-(3) 500 times by performing a 
sampling with replacement of the elasticity values, and  
5. analyze the results 
The results of the sensitivity analysis confirm that the main messages presented in this 
paper hold irrespective of the values assigned to the different model elasticities. In Table 
D.1 the confidence intervals for each macro result are presented; similar results for other 
variables are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table D.1: Sensitivity Analysis Results 
combi (crisis) scenario 
mean sd lim-inf lim-sup
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
National accounts (chg%)
Household consumption -6.977 0.657 -7.039 -6.916
Fixed investment -49.351 3.517 -49.680 -49.023
Government consumption 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exports -1.752 2.269 -1.964 -1.540
Imports -22.606 2.244 -22.815 -22.396
GDP market price -4.134 0.951 -4.223 -4.046
Net indirect taxes -13.197 2.744 -13.453 -12.940
GDP factor cost -1.610 0.530 -1.660 -1.561
Price indices (100=base)
Consumer price index 89.565 1.371 89.437 89.694
Domestic price index (*) 87.747 1.412 87.615 87.879
Terms of trade (pe/pm) 84.105 0.000 84.105 84.105
World price index (**) 91.007 0.000 91.007 91.007
Real exchange rate 103.742 1.676 103.586 103.899
Unemployment (%)
Total 8.778 0.783 8.705 8.852
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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